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Abstract 
 
Activism is on the rise in Europe. In recent years, hedge funds have begun to target firms across 
the continent with the intent of generating profits through exercising shareholder rights to 
prompt change and address inefficiencies. Their interventions often lead to controversy as to 
whether they are a beneficial ownership addition to firms and their shareholders. 
 
This thesis measures market reactions to the first ownership disclosure made by activist hedge 
funds in European listed firms. Through the application of a quantitative research method using 
an event study methodology, this thesis finds significant evidence that abnormal returns arise 
in the activist target firm shares, as well as that there is a difference both in the amount and 
behavior of abnormal returns depending on the circumstances surrounding the entry. 
Furthermore, we find significant abnormal returns to be present in each day of the post-
revelation week, suggesting that an uninformed investor can profit from following the activists. 
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1. Introduction 
Hedge fund activism is an old phenomenon dating back to the corporate raiding and takeover 
boom of the 1970’s and 1980’s in the United States (Cheffins & Armour, 2011). However, it 
took until early 21st century for it to make an impact on the European markets. Today, the 
largest and most active European focused hedge fund is Cevian Capital, having made a 
multitude of activist investments since its founding in 2002. One example of such an investment 
is Cevian’s acquisition of a large stake in Volvo, in which they replaced a majority of the 
directors as well as the CEO and sold off parts of the company to focus on its truck business 
(Milne, 2017). 
 
The actions that Cevian undertook in Volvo are examples of shareholder activism. Various 
types of institutional investors have been engaging in activism over the years, although with 
very mixed results (Brav, Jiang, Partnoy, Thomas., 2008). According to Davis and Steil (2001, 
p.1), “Institutional investors may be defined as specialized financial institutions that manage 
savings collectively on behalf of small investors toward a specific objective in terms of 
acceptable risk, return maximization, and maturity of claims”. Ivanova (2016, p.175) defines 
institutional investors as “[...] bodies that trade in large share quantities and invest money on 
behalf of shareholders”. Black (1990) states that a lot of institutional investors suffer from the 
free-riding problem as well as conflicts of interest, resulting in poor results in terms of firm 
performance improvements. Hedge funds, on the other hand, generally do not suffer from the 
issues of other institutional investors because they have stronger financial incentives, are 
subject to lighter regulation and have fewer conflicts of interest (Brav et al., 2008). 
 
Dissatisfied shareholders have two courses of actions available to them; either they can voice 
their opinions, or they can sell their shares. The latter option is commonly referred to as voting 
with their feet, or to do “the Wall Street Walk” (Admati & Pfleiderer, 2009). The voice option 
includes a broad spectrum of actions including attending shareholder meetings, nominating 
members to the board of directors and engaging in private dialogues with management in order 
to make them implement the shareholder’s ideas. Shareholder activism has become an 
important aspect of contemporary corporate governance and is defined by Smith (1996, p. 227) 
as “[…] monitoring and attempting to bring about changes in the organizational control 
structure of firms (targets) not perceived to be pursuing shareholder-wealth-maximizing goals”. 
Investors that engage in firms to pursue such activities are commonly referred to as activists. 
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Activists potentially serve as key contributors to the mitigation of agency problems such as 
separation of ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and of conflicts between large, 
controlling shareholders and minority shareholders.  
 
For monitoring to be beneficial, the increase in value of an activist’s shares has to outweigh the 
direct costs of monitoring as well as the opportunity costs of being passive or investing in 
another firm (Larcker and Tayan, 2011; Cubbin and Leech, 1983). By not engaging in 
monitoring, passive shareholders profit more than the active shareholders since the passive 
shareholders do not bear the monitoring costs but are entitled to the gains in share value. This 
can ultimately remove the incentives to monitor. In corporate governance, this phenomenon is 
known as the free riding problem. (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012). 
 
Hedge funds have a large array of strategies at their disposal, and one such strategy that has 
seen a surge in Europe in recent years consists of exercising activism on an industrial scale. For 
example, Elliott Capital Advisors are known for investing aggressively to block acquisition 
attempts or to disrupt the influence of dominant shareholders. Such interventions have led to a 
lot of criticism, where some critics argue that they are too short-term in their approach and that 
they distract firm management from long-term objectives (Cremers, Mascolane & Sepe, 2017). 
On the other hand, some argue that their presence, or the mere threat of it, as well as their 
actions help generate more efficient firms (Gantchev & Jotikasthira, 2017). The pursued 
activities, however, vary in terms of radicalism and range from small structural changes such 
as replacing an underperforming CEO or introducing the firm to a new market all the way to 
firing entire boards, separating product groups into new firms or blocking mergers. 
 
Ordóñez-Calafí & Bernhardt (2017) identify two major profit drivers for the activist hedge 
funds; the main one is to discipline management and implement value increasing changes in 
the acquired firms, and the second is to minimize the intervention costs by secretly acquiring 
their initial stock prior to crossing the critical ownership level (commonly 5%), after which the 
public will be notified of the intervention. 
 
The typical compensation scheme of hedge funds is comprised of a 1-2% annual fee on the 
assets under management in addition to a 15-25% performance fee on the return of the fund 
above a certain benchmark (Stulz, 2007). That being said, investing in a hedge fund comes with 
high costs. Since activist hedge funds often purchase large enough stakes to invoke an 
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ownership disclosure, or choose to make public statements, an investor could instead simply 
follow the fund and mirror its investments.  
 
Prior studies investigating hedge fund activism have primarily been conducted on American 
activism (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Boyson & Mooradian, 2011), measuring stock 
performance in proximity to ownership disclosures. Unanimously, they find that the entrance 
of hedge fund activists in firms generate short-term abnormal returns. However, there appears 
to be a lack of empirical findings indicating what kind of market reaction activist hedge fund 
entries generate in Europe, except for one study by Bessler, Drobetz & Holler (2015) conducted 
on the German market. Since the European market differs from the US market in several ways, 
it cannot be safely assumed that the market reaction to hedge fund activism will be the same. 
Firstly, Europe has a different, tighter regulatory environment from the US and consists of 
several countries with their own interpretations of the EU-adopted directives. This leads to 
differences both in investor protection as well as disclosure regulation, both of which are key 
elements in activism. Secondly, the corporate governance tradition in Europe is different from 
the one in the US and activism has not been as prominent in Europe. Thirdly, according to 
Faccio and Lang (2002), ownership structures in Europe are dominated by strong majority 
shareholders owning more than 20% of the firm, whereas in the US, ownership is more 
dispersed (Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer., 1999). 
 
Despite the typical European corporate ownership structure and tight regulatory environment, 
there appears to have been a surge in both hedge fund activism as well as media coverage in 
recent years (e.g. Grumberg, Hopkins, Corte., 2018). Consequently, it is imperative that we find 
out the effects of such activism. It is clear that the activists see potential value waiting to be 
unlocked in European firms, otherwise they would most likely not be increasing their 
investments in the region. But the question remains: what does the market believe?  
 
1.1. Purpose 
This paper intends to measure the market reaction to hedge fund activism in European listed 
firms. By doing so, we can get a picture of the market attitude towards European activism which 
also serves as an implication regarding the effectiveness of European corporate governance. 
Furthermore, we will investigate whether the market reacts instantaneously or if it could be a 
viable strategy to invest in response to an activist announcing its engagement in a firm.  
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1.2. Structure of the paper 
Section 2 presents a theoretical framework consisting of literature studies, previous research 
and our hypotheses. Section 3 describes the method and sample construction and section 4 
provides the results by order of hypothesis. Moreover, in section 5 we critically discuss and 
analyze the results presented in section 4 in light of the theoretical framework provided in 
section 2. Lastly, in section 6 we present a conclusion, in which we summarize our results, 
discuss some shortcomings of the study and give suggestions for future research related to the 
topic. 
 
2. Theoretical framework and previous research on the topic  
This section provides a theoretical framework which leads to three hypotheses. Firstly, we 
discuss the efficient market hypothesis and the implications it provides for price adjustments. 
Continuing, there is a discussion regarding the structural market conditions, and lastly a review 
of previous studies on the topic is provided. 
 
The efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) is an investment theory saying that prices should 
reflect all publicly available information and that securities respond immediately to any new 
information, making it impossible to outperform the market. Thus, the only way of achieving 
higher returns is either by luck or by pursuing riskier investments. There are three versions of 
the efficient market hypothesis: a weak form, a semi-strong form and a strong form. In the weak 
form of market efficiency, the share prices already reflect all information that can be derived 
by examining market trading data such as historical prices, trading volume etc., making it 
impossible to outperform the market based on technical analysis. Under the semi-strong form, 
all obviously publicly available information such as fundamental data, earnings forecasts and 
dividends are already incorporated in the price. Therefore, one should not be able to buy 
undervalued stocks based on fundamental analysis. Lastly, in the strong form of market 
efficiency, all information regarding the firm, whether private or public, is incorporated in the 
share price.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that Europe is not a homogenous market in terms of corporate 
ownership structure, which is illustrated by Porta et. al (1999) in a study of ownership structures 
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in 27 developed economies around the world. Their study indicates that continental Europe has 
more concentrated ownership in comparison to the US and UK where firm ownership is more 
dispersed. Their findings are further strengthened by Faccio and Lang (2002), who find that 
firms in Europe as a whole are typically family controlled (44,29%) or subject to dispersed 
ownership (36,93%). However, there are large differences between countries where for instance 
UK firms are typically (63,08%) subject to dispersed ownership, whereas the percentage of 
German firms that are subject to dispersed ownership is only 10,37%. The relationship for 
family-controlled firms is the opposite, where continental Europe has the highest percentages 
and the UK the lowest.  
 
The classic explanation for activism is that it mitigates the problems stemming from the 
separation of ownership and control (Berle & Means, 1936), which causes agency problems 
between firm management and owners. This works as an explanation for activism in the US 
and UK markets where many firms are subject to dispersed ownership but fails to motivate 
activism in continental Europe and Scandinavia. For firms with concentrated ownership 
however, the explanation for activism may differ. A possible explanation could be the  
principal-principal problem, which is a different agency problem that arises when majority 
shareholders start abusing their ownership control to enjoy private benefits at the expense of 
minority shareholders (Renders and Gaeremynck, 2012). Traditionally, this type of conflicts 
has been thought to frequently occur in emerging economies, but according to Renders and 
Gaeremynck (2012) such problems may exist in European markets with concentrated 
ownership as well. Furthermore, Love (2010) states that good corporate governance is needed 
to reduce the problems associated with private benefits of control enjoyed by majority 
shareholders. 
 
In an attempt to harmonize the European financial markets, the European Commission has 
adopted the Transparency Directive which states that any shareholder acquiring shares in a 
listed firm whose voting rights reach or exceed 5%, both directly and indirectly, should notify 
the company of the acquisition within 4 trading days (Council Directive 2001/34/EC). The US 
regulation law, on the other hand, states that such a notification “[…] must be filed by an 
investor with the SEC within 10 days of acquiring 5% of any class of securities of a publicly 
traded company if they have an interest in influencing the management of the company” (Brav 
et al., 2008, p.1736). This means that an investor has 6 more days before it has to disclose its 
ownership in the US compared to in the European Union. According to Seretakis (2014), these 
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tighter rules that are present in the EU severely harm the incentives for activism as it limits the 
possibility to secretly acquire stocks after crossing a critical ownership level, which is a major 
profit driver for activists (Ordóñez-Calafí & Bernhardt, 2017). 
  
Although there is limited research on European activism, plenty of studies have measured stock 
returns in proximity to the first ownership disclosure by activists in the US. Studies are, 
regardless of geographical focus, unanimous in terms of finding abnormal returns. Interestingly, 
most studies find that the market reaction differs between aggressive and non-aggressive 
interventions.  
 
By looking at 1057 initial disclosure filings by hedge funds between 2001 and 2006 from the 
US, Brav et al. (2008) find abnormal returns of 7.2% in the 41-day window surrounding the 
filings and roughly 6% in the 21-day window. Clifford (2008), with a sample constructed using 
the same method as Brav et al. (2008), observe abnormal returns of 3.39% within the five days 
surrounding the ownership disclosure. When first identifying activists and then looking at their 
interventions, Boyson & Mooradian (2011) find mean cumulative abnormal returns of 8.10% 
within a 51-day event window and 8.68% within a 21-day event window. Bessler et al. (2015) 
find that abnormal returns in Germany are positive, yet smaller than the ones in the US, and 
significant at the 1% level in a range of different event windows, which provides an idea that 
at least the German reaction towards hedge fund activism is similar to that of the US. Their 
sample is constructed through screening news articles for the words “hedge fund” and various 
company names, which illustrates the struggle resulting from the lack of a unified database for 
disclosure filings in the EU, such as EDGAR in the US. 
 
Some earlier studies (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Bessler et al., 2015) categorize their 
observations depending on the circumstances surrounding the first public announcement. Some 
use the terms aggressive/non-aggressive while others use the terminology hostile/non-hostile. 
Brav et al. (2008, p.1732) uses the following definition of hostility: “[…] hostility includes a 
threatened or actual proxy contest, takeover, lawsuit or public campaign that is openly 
confrontational”. This paper will use the aggressive/non-aggressive terminology and the 
selection criteria will be further developed in the method section. The aggressive interventions 
seem to outperform the passive ones in the short-term (Brav et al., 2008; Clifford, 2008; Bessler 
et al., 2015). However, the passive German interventions surpass the aggressive ones in terms 
of cumulative average abnormal returns after approximately 100 days (Bessler et al., 2015).   
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2.1. Hypotheses 
An implication drawn from the efficient market hypothesis (Fama, 1970) is that the revelation 
of an activist having acquired a stake in a firm should give rise to abnormal returns if the market 
believes it will have an effect on future performance. Prior studies on the matter suggest that 
such an announcement generates a positive stock price reaction. However, the fact that a lot of 
European firms have strong owners might make it more difficult for the activist to implement 
its intended changes and could thus limit the impact. This assumption is strengthened by Bessler 
et al. (2015) who find lower abnormal returns in Germany compared to similar studies on the 
US market. Nonetheless, we have constructed the following hypothesis which we intend to test: 
 
Hypothesis I: There are abnormal returns in proximity to the entrance of an activist hedge fund 
in European listed firms 
 
Barber and Odean (2008) hypothesise and prove that investors are attracted to stocks that 
receive attention in media. They argue that this stems from the impossibility to analyze all 
stocks on the market, leading to abnormal share turnover in those that receive more publicity. 
In light of this, and in combination with a stock price reaction due to new market information, 
we believe that the circumstances surrounding the activist entries affect the reactions. More 
specifically, those interventions where the activists are openly critical towards the firm 
management are more likely to receive publicity than those when they do not. This should make 
it easier for the market to evaluate such interventions by determining the odds of a successful 
campaign as well as its value potential. Therefore, and in line with prior researchers (Brav et 
al., 2008; Clifford, 2008, Bessler et al., 2015), we expect to find a difference in abnormal returns 
when categorizing the events into aggressive and non-aggressive interventions.  
 
Hypothesis II: The market reaction differs depending on whether or not the intervention is 
accompanied by openly critical comments towards the target firm management. 
 
In accordance with the efficient market hypothesis, the market should process the new 
information regarding an activist entry immediately and adjust the value of the stock 
accordingly (Fama, 1970). However, previous research (Brav et al., 2008; Boyson & 
Mooradian, 2011; Bessler et al., 2015) find abnormal returns in the week following the event. 
Bachelor Thesis in Financial Economics 2018 
 
 
 
10 
Therefore, contradictory to the efficient market hypothesis, we believe that abnormal returns 
will continue to rise in the post-revelation week. This hypothesis will be tested by looking at 
abnormal returns during the post-revelation trading week. For this test the event day will be 
excluded since we cannot safely assume that an investor acting on these news can take part in 
the potential abnormal returns generated on the event day.  
 
Hypothesis III: An investor can achieve abnormal returns by purchasing stock in the target 
firm of an activist on the day after the announcement and holding it for the post-revelation 
week. 
 
3. Method 
3.1. Event Study 
We implement an event study methodology in order to answer our hypotheses and investigate 
whether or not activist hedge fund investments in Europe generate value both for existing 
shareholders and for those who follow the activist. An event study is a powerful method for 
estimating the financial impact of an unanticipated event where the impact is characterized by 
“abnormal” security returns (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
 
According to MacKinlay (1997), the first assignment when conducting an event study is to 
determine the event one intends to study and subsequently identify the event window, which is 
the period over which security prices will be examined. In agreement with prior researchers the 
event of interest in this study is characterized by the day upon which firm ownership by an 
activist hedge fund becomes known to the public. The length of the event window will be 21 
days, that is the impact will be measured on day -10 until day 10 where the event date is day 0. 
Having a long event window is difficult to reconcile with the assumption of market efficiency 
but the reasoning behind the length of the event window is based on the findings of Brav et al. 
(2008) which show that abnormal share turnover and cumulative abnormal returns are 
unusually high during these days. These findings imply that information leakage could exist 
which, according to McWilliams and Siegel (1997), could motivate having a longer event 
window in order to capture the true effects of the event.  Secondly, it is necessary to decide the 
length of the estimation window during which normal performance will be measured. In this 
study the estimation window will consist of 160 days, namely day -200 until day -40. It is 
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important to not have any overlapping between the estimation window and the event window 
so that normal return parameters are not estimated from returns of the event (MacKinlay, 1997). 
Leaving a gap between the windows also allows for an increased event window for robustness 
testing without changing the normal return parameters. The timeline of the study will be 
indexed 𝜏. An illustration of the timeline is given by Figure 1 below where 𝜏 = 𝑇$ to 𝑇% is the 
estimation window and 𝜏 = 𝑇% + 1 to 𝑇( is the event window and 𝜏 = 0 is the event date. 
 
Figure 1 Event study timeline 
 
 
3.2. Normal Return 
There are several methods one can use in order to measure normal return and thus abnormal 
return. These methods are divided into two separate categories: statistical and economic 
methods. In this study, the Market model which falls into the statistical category is used. It is 
used due to its dominance in event studies which could be explained by the fact that it reduces 
the variance of the abnormal return compared to the simpler Constant Mean Return Model 
which assumes a constant return based on average historical stock return during a given time 
interval. Furthermore, the Market model does not demand as many factors as a multifactor 
model which in comparison generally has limited improvements in terms of abnormal return 
variance (MacKinlay, 1997). The use of an economic model was ruled out due to its need of 
restrictions and assumptions as well as the small potential gains compared to the Market model, 
as discussed by MacKinlay (1997). The Market model assumes a linear relationship between 
any given stock and the market portfolio and in order to estimate normal return it is necessary 
to regress the return of security 𝑖 at time 𝑡 on the return of the market at time 𝑡 in order to get 
the security’s beta. The normal return for the security is then defined as the beta multiplied by 
the market return. Algebraic expressions for the Market model is  
  
      𝑅-. = (𝛼- + 𝛽-𝑅2. + 𝜀-.)     
    𝐸[𝜀-.] = 0          𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝜀-.) = 𝜎(<=, 
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where 
- 𝑅-. is the return of stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡 
- 𝑅2. is the return of the market on day 𝑡 
- 𝜀-. is the error term for stock 𝑖 on day 𝑡 
- 𝛼-, 𝛽-, 𝜀-. are OLS estimated parameters of the model.  
 
Since our sample, which is more thoroughly explained in a later section, consists of securities 
traded on different markets across Europe, different market indices are used to proxy the market 
portfolio. For example, if the security of interest is traded on the Swedish stock exchange, the 
market portfolio is represented by OMXS30, whereas if it is traded on the German market, 
DAX is used as proxy.   
 
3.3. Abnormal Return 
In order to estimate the impact of the activist fund’s entry it is necessary to compute abnormal 
returns in the event window. Abnormal return is defined as the return of a security given the 
impact of the event subtracted by the predicted return (Brown & Warner 1980), as estimated by 
the Market model.  
 
For a specific stock 𝑖 and day 𝑡 the abnormal return is defined as 
  𝐴𝑅-. = 𝑅-. − 𝐸(𝑅-.|𝑋.), 
 
where 
- 𝐴𝑅-. is the abnormal return 
- 𝑅-. is the actual return 
- 𝐸(𝑅-.|𝑋.) is the normal return 
- 𝑋. is the conditioning information given by the Market model. 
 
When using the Market model to estimate normal return, abnormal return is defined as the error 
term given by the model and is estimated in the following way: 
 𝐴𝑅B-C = 𝑅-C − 𝛼D − 𝛽E𝑅2C. 
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Once abnormal returns for each day within the event window has been computed for each 
security, the firm specific abnormal returns during the event window are aggregated in order to 
get the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each security. The algebraic expression for this 
calculation is 
 𝐶𝐴𝑅G-(C%,C() = 	∑ 𝐴𝑅B-,C	C(CKC% . 
 
However, since this study is testing whether or not activist hedge fund entries in general have 
a significant effect on stock return, the data is further transformed to include an average across 
all observations over time. This results in the cumulative average abnormal return variable 
(CAAR), which is computed as  
 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅G (C%,C() = %L ∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅G-(C%,C()L-K% . 
 
In order to test if abnormal return in the event window across securities differs from zero, the 
following cross-sectional θ-test is conducted: 
 θ% = NOOPG (QR,QS)TUVW	XNOOPG (QR,QS)Y 	~	𝑁(0,1). 
 
In case of a rejected test we can conclude that the entry of an activist hedge fund has significant 
impact on stock return. The test is conducted on the following alpha levels; 𝛼 = 0,1, 𝛼 = 0,05, 𝛼 = 0,01. 
 
3.4. Data Collection 
In the absence of a database gathering all ownership announcements within Europe, we 
constructed our sample by identifying activist funds and events in three steps. Step one 
consisted of scrutinizing Activist Investing in Europe (Grumberg et al. Editions 2014, 2016 & 
2017), a paper written by partners at Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP that is 
published on the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation. Having identified the activists that were most frequently mentioned in these 
publications, the second step was to search for each activist both in the Bloomberg Terminal 
and the Factiva database to see whether there was sufficient information regarding previous 
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holdings and activist campaigns. Hedge funds yielding insufficient information were dropped. 
The third step was to scan the Bloomberg Terminal for the remaining funds’ holdings, both 
current and previous, to identify distinct events to study. The criterion for inclusion was that 
the held firm was listed on a European stock exchange. Furthermore, each event that fulfilled 
the inclusion criterion was investigated to find the date of the first notification of the activists’ 
entrance to the firm. The investigation consisted searching for news primarily on the Bloomberg 
Terminal and Factiva, but also through regular internet search. The first announcements of the 
activists’ positions come in different forms and include ownership filings, such as disclosure 
filings at Finansinspektionen for Swedish firms, public statements by fund managers and 
occasionally even articles in business press such as Bloomberg, Financial Times and Dagens 
Industri among others. Table 1 shows the different hedge funds included in the study as well as 
their contribution to the study. For countries included in the study and benchmarks used to 
estimate normal return, see table 2.  
 
Table 1 Sample summary by hedge fund 
Hedge fund Country of origin Events % of sample 
Third Point Management United States 2 2,78 
Elliott Capital Advisors United States 16 22,22 
ValueAct Capital United States 4 5,56 
TCI Fund Management United Kingdom 6 8,33 
Cevian Capital Sweden 20 27,78 
Oasis Management Company Hong Kong 1 1,39 
Polygon Global Partners United Kingdom 3 4,17 
Amber Capital United Kingdom 2 2,78 
Knight Vinke Asset Management Monaco 7 9,72 
Teleios Capital Switzerland 9 12,5 
Corvex Management United States 2 2,78 
Total: 72 100,00 
 
  
Market Reactions to Hedge Fund Activism in Europe 
 
 
 
15 
 
Table 2 Sample summary by target firm market where firm market is determined by the exchange on 
which the target firm is listed. 
Country Benchmark Firms % of sample 
Netherlands AEX 3 4,17 
France CAC40 9 12,50 
Germany DAX 13 18,06 
Italy FTSEMIB 4 5,56 
Finland OMXH25 2 2,78 
Norway OSEBX 1 1,39 
Spain IBEX35 1 1,39 
Denmark OMXC20 1 1,39 
Sweden OMXS30 6 8,33 
Switzerland SMI 5 6,94 
United Kingdom FTSE100 27 37,50 
Total: 72 100,00 
 
3.5. Excluded events 
When gathering the data, events had to be excluded for various reasons. Firstly, if we could not 
ascertain the date of the first announcement or if no information regarding the intervention 
could be found through our search methods, the event was dropped. Secondly, if the target firm 
had recently gone through an IPO and as a result did not have sufficient trading days to estimate 
its normal performance through the Market model, it was excluded. Furthermore, according to 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) event studies are sensitive to outliers, especially when using 
small samples. Therefore, if the target had recently been subject to a tender offer close to the 
activist intervention that had a severe impact on the abnormal returns, we decided to drop the 
observation when testing hypotheses I and II. An example of such a case is that off SLM 
Solutions, where General Electric had made a tender offer five days prior to the entrance of 
Elliott Capital Advisors, generating a 39% increase in the stock price and abnormal returns of 
45% in the (-10, +10) event window that cannot be ascribed to the entrance of Elliott. For such 
reasons, the interventions in SLM Solutions, Schuler and Akzo Nobel have been removed from 
the sample when testing for hypothesis I & II, which is why it is presented as the adjusted 
sample in the results. However, when testing for hypothesis III, these events are included since 
we are then interested in the result of following the activist, regardless of the development in 
the days preceding the intervention. 
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3.6. Aggressive versus non-aggressive 
When sorting the sample into aggressive and non-aggressive interventions, our criterias differ 
from those of Brav et al. (2008) and Bessler et al. (2015). As this paper is investigating short-
term stock development, we decided to look solely on the comments made by the acquirer, if 
any, on the day of the announcement. Bessler et al. (2015) define a hedge fund as aggressive if 
the hedge fund is known to resort to open hostility such as media campaigns, open letters to 
management and threats of lawsuit, whereas this study classifies a hedge fund as aggressive 
only if they resort to such tactics on the day that their presence is revealed. When using small 
samples, such as the aggressive sample shown in Table 3, McWilliams & Siegel (1997) 
recommend using bootstrap methods to make up for the violation of the normality assumption. 
However, due to time constraint and MacKinlay’s (1997) argument that small samples with 
abnormal returns exceeding 1% still has high power, such bootstrap methods have not been 
conducted.  
 
Table 3 Summary of events by category 
Category Events % of sample 
Aggressive 22 31,88 
Non-aggressive 47 68,12 
Total: 69 100,00 
 
In order to give a more comprehensive understanding regarding our definition of aggressive 
and non-aggressive activism and make it easier to distinguish between the two, the following 
two examples have been constructed.  
 
3.6.1. Aggressive 
On May 2, 2013, hedge fund Knight Vinke notified the stakeholders of UBS via an open letter 
saying that they “[…] question the merits of keeping the Investment Bank under the same roof 
as the Wealth Management and Swiss Banking businesses” due to its different risk-profile, 
arguing that separating them into different entities would unlock value for the shareholders 
(Knight Vinke, 2013, p.1). Statements such as this, where the hedge fund is confrontational 
towards the management of the firm, are sorted into the aggressive category in this paper.  
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3.6.2. Non-aggressive 
On February 19, 2018, it was revealed that ValueAct had acquired a 5.4% ownership stake in 
Merlin Entertainment through a holding notification provided by the London Stock Exchange 
(2018), thus making them the third largest shareholder in the company. In connection to the 
filing, no further comments on the acquired stake were given by ValueAct nor Merlin 
Entertainment other than by a Merlin official who stated that they wish to “[…] maintain a 
strong relationship with all major shareholders” (Financial Times, 2018, p.1). Events such as 
this, when no confrontational statements are made towards the management of the firm, are 
sorted into the non-aggressive category. 
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4. Results 
In this section the results of our statistical tests are presented, and we touch briefly on the 
implications they provide. The critical discussion and analysis are left for the next chapter. All 
tests are performed in Stata. The results of our hypotheses are displayed and then the robustness 
section is presented in which we have conducted cross sectional tests with a variety of event 
windows as well as a test where target firms are separated by country of origin to see if the 
reactions differ across markets. 
 
4.1. Hypothesis I 
Figure 2 Plotted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) during the (-10, +10) event window 
for the adjusted, aggressive and non-aggressive samples (69, 22 and 47 observations, respectively). The 
y-axis represents CAAR in terms of percentages and the x-axis represents days relative to the ownership 
disclosure. 
 
 
As illustrated in Figure 2, we can see that the CAAR for the adjusted sample is a bit tentative, 
balancing above and below zero until day -4 when a longer period of positive abnormal returns 
starts. A major spike in abnormal returns occurs on the day of the announcement. In the days 
following the announcement, CAAR continues to rise with the exceptions of day 6 and 10. On 
day 10 we see the first substantial drop after the event which could potentially be a correction 
of a market overreaction to the activist entry. To complement Figure 2, Table 4 shows the exact 
CAARs during the (-10, +10) event window where we can see that the activist entries generated 
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average abnormal returns, significant at the 1% level, of 3,92%. These results confirm 
Hypothesis I, indicating that the entrance of an activist does in fact generate short term abnormal 
returns. Interestingly, the abnormal returns are not statistically significant until the day of the 
event, after which it is immediately significant at the 1% level.  
 
Table 4 Adjusted sample cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) during the (-10, +10) event 
window. The sample consists of 69 observations where the estimation period for normal return is a  
(-200, -40) day window. The benchmark differs depending on where the target firm is listed, see Table 
2 for details. A θ-test is used in order to test if the CAARs significantly differs from zero.  
Day CAAR (%) θ-value 
-10 -0,01 -0,07 
-9 0,09% 0,26 
-8 -0,13% -0,34 
-7 0,30% 0,73 
-6 0,64% 1,57 
-5 -0,12% -0,23 
-4 -0,03% 0,04 
-3 0,13% 0,18 
-2 0,69% 1,09 
-1 0,94% 1,44 
0 2,45%*** 3,36 
1 2,88%*** 3,83 
2 2,97%*** 3,75 
3 3,28%*** 3,83 
4 3,39%*** 3,78 
5 3,66%*** 3,90 
6 3,33%*** 3,61 
7 3,58%*** 3,68 
8 4,14%*** 4,13 
9 4,44%*** 4,18 
10 3,92%*** 3,66 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1% level 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the (-10, +10) to 
complement the CAARs given in Table 4. The sample consists of 69 observations where the estimation 
period for normal return is a (-200, -40) day window. The benchmark differs depending on where the 
target firm is listed, see Table 2 for details. The spread is computed as the difference between the 
maximum and minimum CAR on day 10. 
Statistics Adjusted Sample 
25th Percentile 0,42% 
Median 2,77% 
75th Percentile 8,63% 
Standard Deviation 8,78% 
Spread 49,24% 
 
 
4.2. Hypothesis II 
As illustrated by Figure 2, there appears to be a distinct difference in abnormal returns generated 
by aggressive and non-aggressive activist events. CAAR remains positive throughout the entire 
event window for aggressive events, whereas for the non-aggressive events, CAAR is negative 
until the day prior to the event with the exception of day -6. Abnormal returns seem to stabilize 
on day 2 and onwards for the aggressive sample, while the abnormal return is trending upwards 
for the non-aggressive sample. This signals that the market is quicker to digest and adjust to the 
information in the aggressive interventions. Figure 2’s shortcoming of not showing exact 
CAARs and whether or not the results are significant is overcome by Table 6. The abnormal 
returns become statistically significant at various levels prior to the event day in the aggressive 
sample whereas it takes until the event day for the non-aggressive sample to become significant 
at the 10% level. As shown in Table 6, the aggressive sample CAAR for the full event period 
(10, +10) is 5,07% and statistically significant at the 1 % level while the non-aggressive 
sample’s CAAR is 3,40% and statistically significant at the 5% level. In line with Hypothesis 
II, there appears to be a difference in abnormal returns depending on the activist’s approach 
and the market appears to favor the aggressive interventions.   
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Table 6 Aggressive and non-aggressive cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) during the  
(-10, +10) event window. The aggressive and non-aggressive samples consist of 22 and 47 observations, 
respectively, where the estimation period for normal return is a (-200, -40) day window. The benchmark 
differs depending on where the target firm is listed, see Table 2 for details. A θ-test is used in order to 
test if the CAARs significantly differs from zero.  
 Aggressive Non-aggressive 
Day CAAR θ-value CAAR θ-value 
-10 0,27% 0,63 -0,14% -0,62 
-9 0,60% 0,89 -0,14% -0,36 
-8 0,79% 1,03 -0,56% -1,25 
-7 1,26%* 1,76 -0,14% -0,29 
-6 1,36%* 1,88 0,31% 0,64 
-5 1,16% 1,43 -0,70% -1,11 
-4 1,82%* 1,91 -0,80% -0,97 
-3 2,14%** 2,23 -0,79% -0,85 
-2 2,86%*** 3,21 -0,30% -0,38 
-1 2,85%** 2,73 0,06% 0,08 
0 3,65%*** 3,84 1,89%* 1,96 
1 4,54%*** 4,38 2,12%** 2,17 
2 4,66%*** 4,40 2,19%** 2,12 
3 4,94%*** 4,54 2,52%** 2,22 
4 4,69%*** 4,09 2,80%** 2,34 
5 5,04%*** 4,24 3,02%** 2,41 
6 4,78%*** 4,25 2,67%** 2,15 
7 4,80%*** 4,39 3,02%** 2,28 
8 4,90%*** 4,19 3,79%*** 2,78 
9 5,16%*** 4,64 4,11%*** 2,80 
10 5,07%*** 4,28 3,40%** 2,32 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1% level 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the (-10, +10) for the 
aggressive and non-aggressive sample to complement the CAARs given in Table 6. The aggressive and 
non-aggressive samples consist of 22 and 47 observations, respectively, where the estimation period for 
normal return is a (-200, -40) day window. The benchmark differs depending on where the target firm 
is listed, see Table 2 for details. The spread is computed as the difference between the maximum and 
minimum CAR on day 10. 
Statistics Aggressive Non-Aggressive 
25th Percentile 1,52% -2,58% 
Median 3,21% 2,51% 
75th Percentile 8,63% 8,63% 
Standard Deviation 5,23% 9,94% 
Spread 21,37% 49,24% 
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4.3. Hypothesis III 
Figure 3 displays the cumulative average abnormal return in the (+1, +5) window for the full 
sample which amounts to 1.19% and is significant at a 1% level (see Table 8). Similar to the 
findings for the adjusted sample, abnormal returns are present in each of the five days following 
the announcement. To an investor, these returns will also be subject to compounding but due to 
the low returns and the short time frame, the effect of compounding is infinitesimal (Table 13, 
appendix). Hence, in order to keep the result section uniform, CAAR is presented. These 
findings indicate that an investor taking a long position in an activist target on the day after the 
announcement and keeps it during the post-revelation trading week can expect a higher return 
than under normal conditions. It is important to understand that this does not always translate 
to a positive return, but generally a higher return during times when normal return would be 
positive and at least a less negative return during times when normal return would be negative.  
 
 
 
Figure 3 Plotted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) during the (+1, +5) event window for 
the full sample consisting of 72 observations. The y-axis represents CAAR in terms of percentages and 
the x-axis represents days relative to the ownership disclosure. 
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Table 8 Full sample cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) during the (+1, +5) event window. 
The full sample consists of 72 observations where the estimation period for normal return is a  
(-200, -40) day window. The benchmark differs depending on where the target firm is listed, see Table 
2 for details. A θ-test is used in order to test if the CAARs significantly differs from zero.  
Day CAAR (%) θ-value 
1 0,48* 1,93 
2 0,57** 2,12 
3 0,85** 2,44 
4 0,95** 2,58 
5 1,19*** 3,00 
*/**/*** indicates significance at the 10%/5%/1% level 
 
 
Table 9 Descriptive statistics of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) during the (+1, +5) for the full 
sample to complement the CAARs given in Table 8. The full sample consists of 72 observations where 
the estimation period for normal return is a (-200, -40) day window. The benchmark differs depending 
on where the target firm is listed, see Table 2 for details. The spread is computed as the difference 
between the maximum and minimum CAR on day 10. 
Statistics Full sample 
25th percentile -0,47% 
Median 0,52% 
75th percentile 3,50% 
Standard deviation 3,24% 
Spread 16,49% 
 
4.4. Robustness 
In order to test the accuracy of our findings, two different types of robustness tests have been 
used. Firstly, 5 additional cross-sectional tests with different event windows are conducted. The 
longer windows serve as tests to see if the abnormal returns are due to a temporary price 
overreaction and not the result of fundamental value changes in the firms, and the shorter 
windows test if the results stay significant when there is less risk of confounding events 
affecting the abnormal returns. Secondly, in light of the discussion regarding Europe not being 
a unified market, cross-sectional θ-tests with a (-10, +10) window are conducted on each of the 
11 markets represented in the sample to see if the results differ across markets. For three of the 
markets, t-tests are conducted instead of cross-sectional tests since they only contain a single 
event.  
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Table 10 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) during the several different event windows 
for the adjusted, aggressive and non-aggressive sample. The adjusted, aggressive and non-aggressive 
samples consist of 69, 22 and 47 observations, respectively, where the estimation period for normal 
return is a (-200, -40) day window. The benchmark differs depending on where the target firm is listed, 
see Table 2 for details. A θ-test is used in order to test if the CAARs significantly differs from zero. 
Event window CAAR (%) 
 Adjusted sample Aggressive Non-Aggressive 
(-30, +30) 3,11%* 5,78%** 1,89% 
(-20, +20) 4,06%** 5,89%*** 3,23% 
(-5, +5) 3,01%*** 3,69%*** 2,70%** 
(-3, +3) 3,25%*** 3,12%*** 3,32%*** 
(-1, +1) 2,19%*** 1,68%*** 2,43%*** 
*/**/*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level 
 
Table 10, displaying different event windows, indicates that the length of the event window has 
effect on both the significance and the magnitude of the results. For the adjusted sample, 
expanding the event window leads to a higher CAAR, yet lower (5%) significance level in the 
(-20, +20) window and a lower CAAR with even lower (10%) significance in the (-30, +30) 
window. In the shortened event window, CAAR is lower than in the original (-10, +10) case 
yet significant at a 1% level. 
 
There appears to be a distinct difference between the aggressive and non-aggressive sample 
both in terms of CAAR and significance of the results. In the (-30, +30) window, the aggressive 
sample generates a substantially higher CAAR (5,78%), which is significant on a 5% level, as 
compared to the insignificant non-aggressive sample CAAR of 1,89%.  Furthermore, in the  
(-1, +1) and (-3, +3) event windows, non-aggressive interventions generate higher CAARs than 
its aggressive counterparts, all of which are significant at a 1% level.  
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Table 11 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) during the (-10, +10) event window for the 
different markets where the target firms are listed. The estimation period for normal return is a  
(-200, -40) day window. For a detailed description of the indices used for respective market, see Table 
2. A θ-test is used in order to test if the CAARs significantly differs from zero for the markets where 
the number of firms exceeds one. For the remaining markets, namely Norway, Spain and Denmark, 
CAR is displayed, and its significance is tested through a t-test. The computation for the t-statistic is 
found in the appendix. 
Country Number of firms CAAR (%) θ-value  
Netherlands 2 −0,17% −0,10  
France 9 0,25% 0,06  
Germany 11 3,16%* 2,06  
Italy 4 9,37%* 2,52  
Finland 2 2,08% 0,43  
Norway 1 13,40% 1,04 T-test 
Spain 1 25,40% 0,97 T-test 
Denmark 1 −2,58% −0,26 T-test 
Sweden 6 5,05%* 2,41  
Switzerland 5 3,61% 1,21  
United Kingdom 27 3,82%* 2,00  
Total: 69    
*/**/*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level.  
 
Table 11 displays CAAR and significance for interventions in each separate market within the 
sample, indicating that the abnormal returns differ depending on where the target firm is listed. 
Significant positive returns at the 10% level are found on the Swedish, Italian, German and 
United Kingdom markets. Notably, only the Dutch and Danish markets generate negative, yet 
insignificant, CAARs. 
 
5. Analysis 
The purpose of this section is to critically evaluate the results presented in Section 4 in light of 
the theoretical framework established in Section 2 as well as to discuss possible explanations 
as to what could be driving the abnormal returns. 
 
It appears that abnormal returns as an effect of activists taking interest in a firm is not a 
phenomenon restricted to the US market but that it also exists on the European market. The 
market reaction to the revelations suggests that the market values the entrance of an activist to 
an average of 3,92% of the target firm’s market capitalization. This hints that the market 
believes that the European firms targeted by activists are not run as efficiently as they could be 
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and that it has positive expectations on the activists’ interventions. In line with our suspicion, 
the average abnormal return in Europe is lower than what Brav et al. (2008), Clifford (2008) 
and Boyson & Mooradian (2011) found in the US. However, since firm characteristics were 
not researched, we cannot guarantee that our sample is representative for the typical ownership 
structures mentioned in Faccio & Lang (2002). This means that the lower abnormal returns 
compared to the US does not necessarily stem from firms having concentrated ownership. The 
fact that the UK, which has similar ownership structures to the US (Faccio & Lang, 2002; Porta 
et al., 1999), also show substantially lower abnormal returns than the US further suggests that 
ownership concentration is not the main reason to the lower abnormal returns. The large 
variance in abnormal returns across countries indicates that it is not necessarily as simple as to 
interpret the results of our study as representative for the entire European market.  
 
However, the fact that the market is welcoming to activists and value their entrance positively 
suggests that activism is a good tool to improve corporate governance. Thus, European 
regulators should work to facilitate a regulatory environment that supports the growth of 
activism. Seretakis (2014) argues that the current ownership disclosure regulation impedes 
activism and deprives shareholders as well as society from the economic benefits that stem 
from it. Possibly, an investigation on the current regulation regarding ownership disclosures 
could be a first step towards a more beneficial environment for activists which could also 
benefit the economy as a whole.  
 
As for hypothesis II, our results are similar to those found by Brav et al. (2008), Clifford (2008) 
and Bessler et al. (2015), where there is a distinct difference in abnormal returns generated by 
the different intervention types. This shows that interventions where the activist is openly 
critical to the management, shareholders or bidders on the announcement day generate higher 
abnormal returns than interventions where the entrance is subtler. We hypothesize that there 
are three different reasons for these differences. Firstly, the aggressive approach is usually 
accompanied by news articles regarding the activist’s interest and intended changes in the firm 
which could potentially lead to attention-driven purchases by investors (Barber and Odean, 
2008).  Secondly, it could be due to market beliefs that concerns being addressed publicly run 
a bigger chance of being considered and thus motivate a higher valuation. Thirdly, it could be 
that it is more difficult to value the changes that an activist wants to implement in the company 
as well as the probability of successfully implementing them when they are not clearly stated.  
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If both types of activist entries had generated positive abnormal returns in the days prior to the 
event, one could have argued in line with Ordóñez-Calafi & Bernhardt (2017) that it is driven 
by an increase in demand as the activist wants to acquire as many stocks as possible prior to the 
announcement of its presence. However, as can be seen in Table 6, this is not the case which 
means that there must be an alternative, or rather a complementing, explanation to the different 
developments prior to the event day. Since the abnormal returns generated on the event day are 
substantially higher for the non-aggressive sample than for the aggressive one, it suggests that 
the market somewhat anticipates the aggressive interventions. This, in combination with the 
run-up in abnormal returns prior to the event and the lower impact of the aggressive 
interventions in the shorter time windows, suggests that the activist may have leaked 
information to other investors, possibly in order to increase the odds of a successful campaign 
by gaining voting power in case there will be a proxy contest. This is in line with Brav et al.’s 
(2008) suspicion that hedge funds commonly resort to “tipping” (leakage). However, an 
alternative explanation might be that the target firm management or another stakeholder, who 
may have incentives to keep the current strategy and management, leaks the information in 
order to make it more expensive for the activist to gain influence.  
 
Furthermore, the fact that abnormal returns stagnate for the aggressive sample from day 1 and 
onwards, whereas the trend is more positive for the non-aggressive sample, has two possible 
explanations other than that leakage has already allowed the market to fully incorporate the new 
information in the stock prices of the aggressive sample. Either the market is having difficulties 
valuing the entrances by activists whose intents are unclear, or confounding events that were 
not accounted for are driving the abnormal returns. After all, the sample consists of hedge funds 
known to demand change in the firms they invest in, which makes it plausible that confounding 
events related to the entry could occur after the interventions. 
 
The findings shown in Table 8 indicate that the market does not digest new information 
instantaneously as the efficient market hypothesis suggests, and that an uninformed investor 
can achieve abnormal returns by trading in the post-revelation week. However, this strategy 
fails to catch the lion’s share since most of the abnormal returns are generated up until the event 
day. Thus, in the absence of fees for assets under management and performance, as well as if a 
hedge fund charges fairly low fees, it would most likely be more profitable for an investor to 
be a part of the hedge fund. Be that as it may, it is important to keep in mind that hedge funds 
are not widely available to the public (Partnoy & Thomas, 2006) which means that following 
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their investments could be a viable alternative for the average uninformed investor. 
Nonetheless, there are some obstacles that an investor would have to consider before applying 
a pan-European follow strategy. Firstly, one would need to secure access to the market on which 
the security is traded. Secondly, transaction costs such as commission will incur. As we are 
seeing abnormal returns just above 1%, these might be completely eradicated by commission. 
Lastly, if the target firm is traded in a foreign currency, the investor is exposed to currency 
exchange rate risk which will also impact the return. Taking this into consideration, achieving 
net abnormal returns is all but guaranteed in the short run, especially if the target is not listed 
in the investors’ home market. 
 
The implications from the robustness tests with different lengths of event windows show that 
our findings are consistent with longer event windows for the adjusted as well as the aggressive 
sample, but not for the non-aggressive sample where the results are insignificant. However, as 
confounding events have not been accounted for in the longer event windows, we cannot safely 
say that the additional abnormal return does not stem from sources other than the activist entries. 
The low abnormal return of the aggressive sample, relative to the non-aggressive in the shortest 
event window (-1, +1) further indicate that the market was not caught entirely off guard by the 
aggressive entrances.   
 
6. Conclusion 
This thesis contributes to the growing body of research on activism conducted by hedge funds 
by investigating how the market reacts to European hedge fund activism, as it has been 
increasing despite the suboptimal market conditions for it. When measuring abnormal returns 
in proximity to ownership disclosures, we have found positive and statistically significant 
abnormal returns in our adjusted sample (3,92%) as well as in the two sub-groups of the sample, 
aggressive (5,07%) and non-aggressive (3,40%). This indicates that the market believes that 
target firms will see improvements as a result of the activist interventions. Thus, we suggest 
that regulators should provide a setting which encourages activism. 
  
Furthermore, we have found that abnormal returns are present in each of the five trading days 
following an activist intervention, creating a possibility for an uninformed investor to achieve 
abnormal returns in the post-revelation week (1,19%) by following the activists. However, it is 
plausible that market imperfections might offset the relatively low abnormal returns. 
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Although our findings are robust to longer event windows at large, there are some shortcomings 
with the way the research was conducted. The fact that we aggregated our observations 
originating from 11 different markets into one large pool of observations despite the discussion 
of Europe not being a single market is troublesome. Evidently, the reactions seem to differ 
between markets. Furthermore, according to MacKinlay (1997), a broad index to proxy the 
market is preferable in event studies. However, this thesis has utilized fairly narrow indices that 
usually includes the largest and/or most actively traded stocks on respective markets which is 
not necessarily as representative for the market as a broad index. Hence, a larger selection of 
observations using broader indices in the different markets that Europe consists of could be 
researched in order to answer if and why reactions actually differ between markets.  
  
Ordóñez-Calafi & Bernhardt’s (2017) claim that activists typically target firms with dispersed 
ownership, yet the typical European firms have concentrated ownership (Faccio & Lang, 2002). 
McWilliams and Siegel (1997) propose that the researcher should regress the abnormal returns 
on explanatory variables in line with a given theory in order to see what truly drives the results. 
In this case, using ownership concentration as an explanatory variable could provide more depth 
to the study. Perhaps the targeted European firms were actually subjects to dispersed ownership 
since making an impact in firms controlled by a large shareholder could prove too difficult, or 
maybe the activists have found a way to circumvent this issue. Is there a specific type of 
ownership structure that attracts European activists, and could there be a difference in activist 
success rate in firms with dispersed versus concentrated ownership? 
 
The data collection method potentially causes a selection bias in the sample, as interventions 
that received more publicity are more likely to be noted and thus included in the sample. The 
problem of gathering a more comprehensive sample stems from the restricted accessibility to 
databases on European activism. Moreover, since the sample consisted of hedge funds that are 
known activists, it can be expected that they will eventually attempt to make changes in the 
firms they invest in, making our definitions of aggressive and non-aggressive quite arbitrary. 
In fact, a few of the hedge funds included in the sample are known to have an aggressive 
strategy but some of their interventions were categorized as non-aggressive because they did 
not make criticizing comments in connection to the ownership disclosure. Thus, an alternative 
way of researching the differences in abnormal returns would be to divide the sample into the 
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two groups based on what strategy the hedge fund usually adopts, similar to Bessler et al.  
(2015). 
  
By studying hedge fund activism and the market reaction to it, we have realized that we have 
merely scratched the surface of the subject. As discussed in this section, the findings of this 
study give rise to a range of new questions that academics may investigate further. 
Nevertheless, the fact that abnormal returns arise in European listed firms upon ownership 
disclosures by hedge fund activists suggests that the market has positive expectations towards 
the activism agenda and believes that it contributes to more efficient corporate governance. 
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8. Appendix 
Table 12 List of firms included in study 
Company Index Event date Type Part of adjusted sample 
ABB SMI 2015-06-04 Non-Aggressive Yes 
ADVA Optical DAX 2017-08-07 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Airbus CAC40 2013-08-02 Aggressive Yes 
Akzo Nobel AEX 2017-03-17 Non-Aggressive No 
Alliance Trust FTSE100 2014-02-26 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Ansaldo STS FTSEMIB 2016-02-01 Aggressive Yes 
Ashcourt Rowan FTSE100 2013-12-20 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Atlantia FTSEMIB 2017-02-14 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Autoliv OMXS30 2018-03-02 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Axis OMXS30 2016-03-29 Aggressive Yes 
Bilfinger DAX 2011-10-31 Non-Aggressive Yes 
British Empire Trust FTSE100 2016-06-30 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Cambian Group FTSE100 2017-04-04 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Carrefour CAC40 2011-03-09 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Celesio AG 
(McKesson) DAX 2013-11-06 Aggressive Yes 
Clariant CAC40 2017-07-04 Aggressive Yes 
Club Med CAC40 2014-06-02 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Danone CAC40 2017-08-14 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Danske Bank OMXC20 2011-11-22 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Darty FTSE100 2010-06-28 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Dufry SMI 2017-12-20 Non-Aggressive Yes 
E.ON DAX 2016-02-17 Aggressive Yes 
Eni FTSEMIB 2009-09-02 Aggressive Yes 
Ericsson OMXS30 2017-05-30 Aggressive Yes 
Fenner PLC FTSE100 2016-04-29 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Ferguson FTSE100 2010-06-23 Non-Aggressive Yes 
G4S FTSE100 2013-08-12 Non-Aggressive Yes 
GEA Group DAX 2017-10-11 Aggressive Yes 
Groupe Eurotunnel CAC40 2017-08-18 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Hogg Robinson FTSE100 2016-04-14 Non-Aggressive Yes 
HSBC FTSE100 2007-09-04 Aggressive Yes 
Intrum Justitia OMXS30 2004-12-01 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Invensys FTSE100 2013-04-29 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Kabel Deutschland DAX 2013-08-16 Non-Aggressive Yes 
KCOM FTSE100 2017-12-06 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Kongsberg OSEBX 2015-12-08 Aggressive Yes 
London Stock 
Exchange FTSE100 2016-02-23 Non-Aggressive Yes 
McBride FTSE100 2016-04-05 Non-Aggressive Yes 
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Merlin Entertainment FTSE100 2018-02-19 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Metso HEX25 2005-05-24 Aggressive Yes 
Muenchener DAX 2007-12-07 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Nestlé SMI 2017-06-27 Aggressive Yes 
Nexans CAC40 2013-10-22 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Old Mutual FTSE100 2009-05-29 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Panalpina 
Welttransport SMI 2010-01-27 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Pendragon FTSE100 2017-10-27 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Premier Foods FTSE100 2016-07-06 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Prezzo FTSE100 2014-11-07 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Promotora IBEX 2014-11-14 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Rexel SA CAC40 2016-02-24 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Rolls Royce FTSE100 2015-07-31 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Royal DSM AEX 2014-07-18 Aggressive Yes 
RSA Insurance FTSE100 2014-03-31 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Safran CAC40 2012-10-09 Aggressive Yes 
Schuler AG DAX 2012-06-12 Non-Aggressive No 
Shell AEX 2004-02-09 Aggressive Yes 
SKY PLC FTSE100 2018-01-29 Non-Aggressive Yes 
SLM Solutions DAX 2016-09-13 Non-Aggressive No 
Smith & Nephew FTSE100 2017-10-10 Aggressive Yes 
Smiths group FTSE100 2015-08-03 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Spirent FTSE100 2018-01-16 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Stada Arzneimittel DAX 2017-07-06 Aggressive Yes 
Telecom Italia FTSEMIB 2018-03-05 Aggressive Yes 
Telia OMXS30 2006-08-30 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Terex DAX 2010-05-21 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Thyssenkrupp AG DAX 2013-09-25 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Tieto HEX25 2009-11-12 Non-Aggressive Yes 
UBS SMI 2013-05-02 Aggressive Yes 
Vesuvius FTSE100 2011-11-14 Non-Aggressive Yes 
Volkswagen DAX 2016-05-06 Aggressive Yes 
Volvo OMXS30 2006-09-06 Aggressive Yes 
WH Ireland Group FTSE100 2014-02-12 Non-Aggressive Yes 
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Computation and values for compounded returns referred to in the results section on 
hypothesis III ^ (1 + 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅G )_CK%  
Table 13 CAARs and Compounded Abnormal Returns in the (+1, +5) window 
Day CAAR (%) θ-value Compounded Return 
1 0,48* 1,93 0,48 
2 0,57** 2,12 0,577 
3 0,85** 2,44 0,859 
4 0,95** 2,58 0,959 
5 1,19*** 3 1,192 
*/**/*** indicates statistical significance at the 10%/5%/1% level 
 
 
Computation of the t-statistic used in Table 11 𝑇% = 𝐶𝐴𝑅G(C%,C()T𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝐶𝐴𝑅G(C%,C()) 
 
